Chapter 4: The Political Kingdom in Independent Africa

Jeffrey Herbst - States and Power in Africa

Chapter 4: The Political Kingdom in Independent Africa (Summary)

(review provided by Fatma Meral and Ece Filizel)

Herbst starts the fourth chapter by mentioning the problem of how to extend power over territories by post-independence African leaders given the inherited incomplete and variable administrative systems of Europeans. The new leaders decided against gaining control of African territory through wars of expansion and they also rejected the precolonial tradition of multiple sovereignties over land with soft borders. Instead, they devised various domestic and international strategies that gave flexibility to the leaders when deciding how to expand the geographic reach of the state while formally preventing any outside challenge to their territorial control.

In general, this chapter explores the attempt to build a large number of states during peace which is the most revolutionary aspect of Africa’s independence. Also, the chapter explores the relative peace that resulted from the decisions made by Africans and how the actions taken by leaders were caused come countries’ destruction.

As author says, there were many similarities between the wave of decolonization(began in 1957) and the process of colonization (formalized in 1885). For instance, after the action was done, the international community had to create a law to justify what had been accomplished and to prevent the new arrangements from being torn asunder by war.

On the other hand, in precolonial Africa there were various political organizations such as villages, city-states, nation-states, empires which rose and fell. However, at independence, African leaders turned their backs on this diversity. The retention of the European nation-state was welcomed by Africans. In fact, in the early 1960s, there were few intellectual sentiments that could effectively counter the draw of the nation-state. However, as colonialism ended, Africa’s new leaders did not foresee an organizing principle other than the nation-state.

The international embrace of the nation-state was an important element in the rapid African rejection of any indigenous alternative. The UN and its related organizations were recognizing only nation-states as legitimate actors in the international community. Particularly, membership in the General Assembly was open to any nation-state that gained independence but was not available to any other form of organization. Considering that membership in international organizations provided important financial benefits, it would be easier to understand the tendency of African leaders to sustain the nation-state system.

After it was clear that the European nation-state would serve as the organizing principle for African politics, it was inevitable that African leaders would decide to retain the boundaries as created by the colonialists. Therefore, African boundaries have been almost unchanged since independence; the only significant change was the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia. On the other hand, the growth and structure of African militaries are indicative of the relative peace in the region for most of the post-independence period. African armies are, by comparative standards, small. At this point, the frequency of military coups in Africa can be questioned but the author says since soldiers have so little to do, they seek to carve out a role for themselves in politics.

As is known, there were not so many international wars in the African region compared to the rest of the world. Although there are many reasons for the relative lack of international war, the author specifies that the fact that territorial competition was not a significant motivation for either the colonialists or the rulers of independent Africa undoubtedly has been a significant factor. On the other hand, while self-determination is an important issue at the charter of Organization of African Unity (OAU), self-determination was deemed only to apply to those countries that were still colonies or that were still under white minority control.

It was important for African countries that the world community has allowed any country, no matter how underdeveloped its political and economic institutions, to enjoy the full privileges of sovereignty since it helped African leaders in their effort to continue the inherited state system. For instance, even if an African country did not have physical control over its own territory, by the rules of the international community, it could not be challenged by other domestic groups or by outsiders.

Author says war in Europe had several positive outcomes such as causing the state to become more efficient in revenue collection by forcing leaders to dramatically improve administrative capabilities. Also, the war created a climate and important symbols around which a disparate population could unify and bond with the state in a manner that legitimized the capital’s authority. Therefore, the author claims that as a result of lack of war, African countries have largely failed to solve these problems which have important implications for their ability to consolidate power and have had a significant impact on the evolution of their political economies. On the other hand, the ability to collect taxes is a crucial element of a state. And Herbst says citizens are much more likely to acquiesce to increased taxation when the nation is at war, so lack of war might cause another adverse effect economically.

Precolonial governments were dependent on taxes from trade. Custom duties and revenue from international commerce generated the biggest part of their total revenue. Another important revenue stream was the aid received from the metropole. Independent African countries inherited the fiscal structure of revenue gained from taxing foreign trade. Some African countries sourced revenue from nontax sources such as mineral concessions. Foreign aid remained a significant feature that was funneled through the state since the private sector was unreliable and underdeveloped. Furthermore, most of the aid was directed at large infrastructure projects, hence the need for government operation.

According to Economic Commission for Africa, the government expenditures were amounted to 17 percent of the GDP in 1960 and 22 percent in 1968 without defense and debt payments. These are low considering the estimated expenditure on the public sector in the Third World countries should be 20 percent of the GDP according to W. Arthur Lewis. African countries relied mostly on indirect taxes because they were more convenient and inexpensive to collect. As a result of some resistance from pressure groups, effective tax reforms were blocked. Besides the populist ideology, civil disorder, and national wealth provided by large single sources such as minerals and government loans, the lack of an organized tax collection was also attributed to the disorganization and laxity of the government. 

An unusual trait of the African economy is the countries’ never-ending deficit spending. Foreign aid allowed governments to spend more than their domestic revenue stream would have allowed. Until recent years, donors didn’t demand economic reforms. After WWII the international community kept many governments solvent.

As mentioned before, since African countries did not face the same security threat that Europe faced, mobilizing revenue through efficient administration is much lower. As a result, the collection of taxes and organization of administration is concentrated in the capital and a few other areas of the country. The public acceptance of tax increases is complicated in the case of civil disputes which are the kinds of domestic security threats that African countries face; civil conflicts which are fragmented and against different segments of the population.

Nationalism in African countries have been artificial since the borders they inherited were the same. Because there were no external threats, due to the establishment of the pact among the nations to respect their territories, the formation of national ties, or the feeling of being under threat because of who people are is lacking in African nations. Most of the African nations, except some (Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe), did not go through a state of war that would have enhanced their nationality and paved the way for the term nation-state becoming a reality. Moreover, the lack of common historical mythology and memory which state elites can build a nation on is the central difficulty. When examined, the anthems of the countries lack the spirit and passion for the specific country, rather they emphasize loyalty for Africa and belief in Africa as a whole.

Lastly, maybe the most important reason for African countries’ underdevelopment, corruption is widespread in Africa. Indirect taxation through imported goods and international transactions hinders the establishment of the link between government taxation and popular support. States’ obligations to bargain with the population in order to gain revenue remain inadequate. This independence of the state allows governments to divert large amounts of revenue to their own purposes. They are free to spend the revenue in nonproductive ways, enriching themselves and their followers; intensifying patronage. In the African case, corruption is so high that the state crumples and the situation becomes suboptimal for the leader as well. Leaders in Zaire, Liberia, and Somalia stole so much as to cause the state to dissolve. Since the international community has been friendly to the weak states; these states that should have failed or conquered in another century still remain safe from external attacks while internally crumpling. Thus the toleration extended to the African states on patronage and corruption hindered the state consolidation processes among other reasons.