Herbst Chapter 3 - The Europeans and the African Problem

Herbst Chapter 3 - The Europeans and the African Problem

(review provided by Deniz Yildirim and Enis Kaan Birgin)

Chapter 3 starts with introducing the concept of “The African Problem”, which is defined as the inability of Europeans in conquering Europe as it did in other regions such as the Americas. As is later elaborated in this chapter, this led the European colonizers each to adopt different strategies for colonizing. Apart from that, a consensus does not exist even among the current scholars on what the nature of colonialism in Africa was. For example, Robert H. Jackson describes colonialism as a legalistic, rule-based system that even benefitted the Africans to some extent. However, on the other side of the debate, Crawford Young asserts that colonialism was a despotic rule imposed upon Africa that sought to smash any resistance against it. Mahmood Mamdani argues that the Europeans used a hegemonic system over Africa, rather than mere physical force, to continue their rule and that this was mainly for economic gains.

While the European colonialism was harsh and intense in most accounts, this was not the case before early 20^th century and the Berlin Conference. Before the conference, most of the European powers were opposed to expansion in Africa. Contrary to the case in the Americas, much of African geography was unknown to the Europeans. The colonizers did not think that it was worth to “conquer” this unknown continent, and there was little European control outside the coasts (only South Africa, with its ample resources of diamonds were an exception to this). Europeans did now favor direct conquest and control because they doubted the utility of economic gains to be made from what was the “poorest continent”.  More of what could be called “soft power” was used to control Africans, such as the Portuguese colonizers converting native populations to Christianity. As mentioned, the majority of European administration was consolidated in coastal areas such as the Ivory Coast or the Gold Coast (now Ghana). In the hinterland and inner areas, the Europeans were just another trading actor.

            Even when the colonizing powers decided to further conquer Africa, they were unwilling to build extended administrative networks. By the late 19^th century, geographic limits were still unknown and there was little knowledge of possible resources to be exploited. The European powers were also unwilling to fight with themselves or with the local powers for these lands which were of questionable value, and this was what led to the Berlin Conference. The conference for the Europeans was a means of peacefully dividing up the continent. The rules set were ambiguous, and the nature of administration minimalist. As the author states: “All that a European country had to do was establish some kind of base

territory on the coast, and then it was free to expand inward without having to establish, except in an ill-defined “reasonable time,” an administrative presence in order to fulfill the obligations of effective occupation.” The power occupying the coast was also assumed to have control over the hinterland.

            As the Europeans aimed at minimal administration, they used the existing pre-colonial structures to continue their rule. When the local treaties were deemed insufficient to set the boundaries for ruling, arbitrary lines based on coordinates were used to set borders. The power of the countries had little to do with the scope of control. The most powerful of the colonizers, Britain, directly controlled small areas, mostly on the coasts. Less powerful countries such as Belgium or Portugal exercised control over larger swathes of territory. Thanks to the Berlin Conference, “controlling” did not have a set meaning, so it could mean anything the colonizing power deemed it to be. Even when they claimed control over a large territory on paper, the actual extent of their authority was very limited outside the coasts. This even persisted until the mid-20^th century, the changes the Europeans made in their administration had little effect on the hinterland.

            The author goes on to argue against the traditional distinction between the French direct rule and the British indirect rule. In reality, there were different approaches in each of the colonial subjects. The indirect rule may be successful or not depending on the nature of the precolonial administrative structures in the respective regions. Instead of just asserting that the British used indirect rule and the French direct rule, the sizes of the road networks are used as an indicator of authority. Accordingly, it can be seen that South Africa has had the highest density of roads. However, it was less than adequate in almost all African regions, which meant a failure of exercising formal power.

            African population who were disaffected by the European rule used migration both as a protest and as a tool. For example, native population living in “French” West Africa simply migrated to the British side of the border, as the British were less oppressive. It is argued that while widespread migration preceded European colonialism, it was further expedited by it. The rise of colonialism started coming to an end in the 20^th century. World War II directed attention away from Africa, and the cost of further penetrating the African lands was still deemed to be too high. The prospects of direct control were abandoned, but the economic exploitation persisted.

            In this chapter, while it is stressed again and again that Europeans imposed limited authority in Africa and usually adopted means of indirect rule, this should not mean that the colonialism was not brutal. In fact, it is argued that violence was a central point in colonialism. However, this was not a result of control but was caused by the lack of formal control in the African hinterland. As there were little administrative structures outside the coasts, the colonizers used force there when they wanted to get something done. It can even be said that using violence was a sign of weakness, not strength.

            In the end, using pre-colonial local administrative structures over the long term proved to be dysfunctional for the Europeans. The author states that “The Europeans wanted to use the “existing machinery” but they were not willing to allow the machinery to continually adapt, as it did in the precolonial period, to new political challenges and opportunities.” It should be no surprise that this led to different outcomes in different regions, as each region had different characteristics. Colonialism was not a single, homogenous system but instead, its application varied according to the colonizing power and the colonized region.