Herbst Chapter 5 - National Design and the Broadcasting of Power

HERBST – CHAPTER 5: National Design and the Broadcasting of Power

(review provided by Esra Nalbantoglu and Yigit Gurpinar)

 

            Hello everyone, we have read and summarized the fifth chapter called National Design and the Broadcasting of Power in the Herbst’s book named “States and Power in Africa”. Herbst introduces his main question in this chapter as what are the political implications of the size and shape of African countries (Herbst, 139)? He comes to the conclusion that political challenges unique to African states in exercising power along with the notion of sovereignty developed in the continent are the reasons why African context diverges significantly from European experiences. Firstly, he reviews the literature and lays out the reasons why shape and size should be taken into consideration. Then, he makes a typology in order to better study African states using size. In his typology, size should be understood as population density and distribution. Lastly, the author shows how size and shape of African nations are translated into power consolidation by examining road infrastructure.

            Firstly, in Africa, prior geographical studies tend to focus on regional and town-country relations. So, no general, at-large geographical analysis has ever been done in Africa (Herbst, 139). In doing so, he aims to prove that unlike the European continent, African conditions favor relatively smaller states (Herbst, 140). Herbst criticizes four general approaches to analyzing national design in Africa, namely political geographers, economists, realist tradition, and classical political theory. Political geographers assume that states can change their shape usually by warfare to overcome the issues posed by their sizes (Herbst, 140). This assumption that states would use force to achieve spatial aspirations holds in the European context, but particularly not in Africa where leaders generally seek to ensure the status quo in terms of borders. Economists, on the other hand, discuss the “optimal number of states.” To them, pure economic calculations drive their aspirations on size and shape. “Economies of scale” suggests that boundaries of nation-states are barriers to economic exchange (Herbst, 142). Economists tend to suggest the relationship between size and efficiency: Looking at European experiences evident for centuries, most scholars argued that the small size of many African countries poses a structural problem. Unless, they asserted, states like Eritrea rely on bigger and more viable neighbors, they would perish. Realist discussion presupposes that the critical period of European state-building would be imported into the African context. Advantages of nation states including standing army and this “economies of scale” are the reason why Europeans came up with the idea the bigger, the better. However, again we should remember that unlike the European context where constant fear of occupation exists, in Africa states respect each other’s borders. Classical political theory pays huge importance in establishing and sustaining smaller political units from Plato to Montesquieu. In the 19th century, however, furious efforts were put to prove otherwise. American president James Madison argued that substantial advantages over smaller units by being able to limit the damage of factions could be laid in bigger political units (Herbst, 143). Despite scholarly comments regarding 20th century strongly favoring larger political units, political leaders did just the opposite: the number of the states increased massively upon dissolution and demolition of empires (Herbst, 144). So, all this literature review brings Herbst to think that inadequate efforts that were put in understanding African geography as a whole coupled with the fixations that African history would coincide with the European one resulted in the overlook of the importance of size and shape in providing or destroying opportunities of progress. 

In his typology, firstly Herbst urges for a truth: Size and shape alone do not matter. “What is critical is the particular population distribution that they present to national leaders” (Herbst, 145). As mentioned earlier, he creates this typology using population density and distribution. He classifies countries into three distinct categories: countries where political geographies turn consolidating power into a nightmare, hinterland countries, and countries easier to exercise power. Also, there are a few countries that do not fit any of the categories. So, let’s start with states challenged by geography. Before looking closer at the cases, there are certain generalizable features of these states. Firstly, they are all large in African terms, except for one. They have some areas of high population density; however, these areas are not connected. So, the population is scattered, and these characteristics is the reason for a more complex ethnic situation. Taking into consideration the fact that in Africa, minorities tend to concentrate on a single area (70% of minorities are located in one region of Africa), the situation gets tougher as ethnic fragmentation sharpens (Herbst, 146). The first example of these countries is the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). DRC has an extremely difficult population distribution. It is high in the capital Kinshasa, but other areas of high population density are distributed all around its large landmass. In between these regions, there are vast empty areas. Also, DRC can be exemplified as a rimland country. Herbst uses this term for countries where building up the infrastructure to consolidate power is hard, because the population concentrates on the borders, leaving interior empty (Herbs, 147). Sudan, a country with long civil war history, also is an example. The capital Khartoum had no connection but airlinks to large population centers in the south, eventually leading Juba to declare independence in 2011. Neighboring Ethiopia also falls short of consolidating power as a result of dispersed agglomerations. In the 1980s, the Addis Ababa government tried to use forced migration in order to overcome this problem, but such a precaution created enormous misery. In the 1990s, a huge insurrection took place in Ethiopia, finally ended with the independence of Eritrea and a new constitution in Ethiopia. The new constitution endowed regions with the right of self-determination and acknowledged the state’s inability of power consolidation. It granted the right to secede to regions (Herbst, 147). In Somalia, as well, population centers in capital Mogadishu, and some other non-contiguous areas. Somaliland, in return, today self-governs. In Western Africa, Nigeria was a scene of civil war to ensure its territorial integrity. Complex ethnic divisions along with religious polarization between Christians and Muslims requires the Nigerian government to implement laws preventing conflict, yet the country’s ability to do so is ambiguous. Senegal, a relatively small country, finds The Gambia separating its densely populated areas. Going south, Mozambique’s length poses it a great deal of problems. Low-density areas separate two population centers from each other, and efforts to unite the country under an all-encompassing political structure failed (Herbst, 150). In Angola, there are 3 independent, unconnected population centers: one in the middle of the country, one on the coast, and the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda. The civil war also hit the country. In Namibia as well, half of the population lives in the far north region. Lastly, Tanzania might look like a compact country, but in fact, it is a rimland one. Less populated areas are encircled by the denser region on the borders. To conclude, for these countries, it cannot be assumed that the physical control of the capital is the total power consolidation in the country because urban areas far from the capital are generally at odds with the capital. This is the notion of sovereignty developed in Berlin, later adapted by the Organization of African Unity. 

            The second category is hinterland countries. They are large in African terms; however, their population is compact. I mean, four countries assigned to this category, namely Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, have small areas of high and middle density, and large hinterlands with very few people. At first glimpse, they may look like they are so hard to govern, but a noticeable percentage of the population lives under the easy reach of the government. Higher urbanization levels than the African average and virtually one urban area lead to peaceful solution to civil wars, as happened in Mali. 

            Last category, countries easier to rule over, can be separated into two subcategories. Firstly, there are countries where the highest concentration of power found in one area, usually around the capital (Herbst, 154). As you go from the capital to periphery, population density gradually declines. Benin is the perfect example for these countries. Also, there is another set of countries that are so small that their population distribution is irrelevant because no obstacle to the extension of authority emerges. This subcategory includes Togo, Lesotho, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Burundi, Rwanda, Swaziland and The Gambia. However, we should keep in mind that there are perils of being small as well. Small countries can also have corrupt and incompetent regimes, but different than larger ones, small states can exercise considerable authority over the population even during decline (Herbst, 155). In smaller countries such as Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, and Burundi, the government easily exercised enormous restrictive power on its citizens in a way bigger countries would not. The last two, Rwanda and Burundi, have committed intensive genocide because of the extensive power they have as a result of their geographies. 

However, we should remember that geography is only a given. It is what states made of them. Some countries that have similar geographies might have different political histories since independence (Herbst,159). When Herbst considers how leaders confront their geographic and demographic endowments by constructing the infrastructure power to understand the implications of the size and shape of nations in Africa, he looks at roads because in Africa roads are the form of access to most rural communities (Herbst,161). He finds a strong relationship between the density of roads at independence -in the 1960s- and in 1997 (Herbst, 164). Thus, countries showed uniformly poor performance in building roads. The failure of African states to enhance their rather bad colonial inheritance generally may cause deficiencies in the progress of political and economic consolidation. (Herbst,164) Here, we see three subcategories of African countries associated with the road structures.

 

Countries w/Difficult Pols. Geographies	Hinterland Countries	Countries w/Favorable Pols Geographies		Countries w/Neutral Pols. Geographies
		Bigger	So small
Angola	Chad	Benin	Togo	Cameroon
Dem. Rep. Of Congo	Mali	Botswana	Lesotho	Cote d'Ivoire
Ethiopia	Mauritania	Burkina Faso	Eq. Guinea	Ghana
Mozambique	Niger	CAR	Guinea-Bissau	Kenya
Namibia		Congo	Burundi	Malawi
Nigeria		Eritrea	Rwanda	Uganda
Senegal		Gabon	Swaziland	Zambia
Somalia		Guinea	The Gambia
Sudan		Liberia
Tanzania		Sierra Leone
		Zimbabwe

 

The countries in need of road networks did not build them. Only three rimland countries were able to increase their road density more than the average increase 69%: Nigeria, Sudan, and Tanzania; and those with least problematic geographies built the most roads when we analyze the comparison between geography and road-building efforts. (Herbst,166) Then, as a result of the poor performance since independence, the overall road-stock of African countries with problematic geographies are unimpressive. Overall, the fact that there is a negative relationship between road density and country size gains importance by the cause of the failure of African countries to overcome their colonial inheritance.  The poor road-building performance of countries with problematic geographies can be associated with the Berlin rules that can mean colonialists' fixed costs to rule the capital. Because of this, colonies with large geographic masses had relatively low road stocks. (Herbst,167) They also could not reverse the situation since independence.  Despite this situation, large countries within the need for roads and economic development associate with each other. Generally, the countries with middle income demand more than low-income African countries for road infrastructure.  

Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger have road density that is below the continental average. The extensive road construction enables the countries to rule over much of their large populations.  However, this situation can cause some misleading. Inefficiency in road building cannot be translated to inefficiency in the consolidation of power. Limited road construction has increased the reach of government effectively. These four countries are doing so badly. (Herbst,167) For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo has three times more road density than Mali's. However, Mali has a more compact system to invade its state power because its people are not scattered as in D.R.O.C. who has to build more roads to reach its populated regions.

Why do those least in need of roods have the highest road densities? Explanation of this is hiding in continental African experience. These countries had relatively high road densities in 1963 because the Berlin rules forced the colonists to build roads around the capital. Then, these countries' sizes are not much larger than the capital and its surrounding area. However, we remember that state consolidation is not absolutely a good thing for the population. For example, Rwanda's high road density led to quick and easier genocide or the government in Zimbabwe exercised extraordinary repression and embargoes, through the use of transportation in its southwest. (Herbst, 169) 

     Then, he examines roads and power politics. The countries facing external threats have to tie their forward areas via road structures. (Herbst, 170) For example, Namibia has a high road density despite its vast regions because it has a profound incentive to build roads, which is related to the struggle against external aggressors. In contrast, there is no reason why most African countries have to build roads to defend themselves from internal threats. In fact, leaders who aware that road could also provide enemies with a chance to march to the capital started to give importance to adopt patronage politics at the core area. 

    Finally, we witness Herbst's reevaluation of the countries' size. We cannot say that traditional bias that supports large states is necessarily relevant to Africa because its strategic and economic conditions are so different from Europe. The internal threats are still alive in Africa.